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Abstract: In many developing countries, groundwater is a common pool resource which is 
potentially subject to the tragedy of the commons if water extraction is not adequately regulated. 
However, in these countries, the regulatory infrastructure is often too weak to allow detailed 
monitoring of individual groundwater extraction. For this reason, classical public intervention 
instruments, such as consumption fees or tradable quotas, are infeasible. Here we present a 
theoretical foundation for a new public regulatory instrument that can potentially generate the same 
efficiency inducing incentives as fees and tradable quotas, but without their information and 
monitoring requirements. The instrument we propose is a tax based on aggregate extraction, rather 
than individual extraction measures.  
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 1.  Introduction 
 
The world’s population is projected to reach almost 8 billion by 2025 (UN (1999)) and concerns are 
often voiced that the future may bring food and resource shortages which will affect poor 
populations (Rosegrant et al. (2001) and Scanes and Miranowski (2004)). An area of major concern 
is the growing demand for water in developing countries. Water is an inherently local good and 
substantial local differences in cost and accessibility may develop and persist with potentially far-
reaching consequences for the affected populations. Today, more than 1 billion people live without 
access to clean water and the number of developing countries classified as water scarce is expected 
to rise in the future (UN (1999)).  
Finding sound solutions to the task of protecting and allocating water resources will 
be a challenge of growing importance in the 21
st Century for many developing countries. At the 
same time, the regulatory options which developing countries have to meet the challenge are not 
abundant. With increasing water shortages, traditional mechanisms for water allocation and conflict 
resolution may not be sufficiently efficient, while classic public regulatory instruments which focus 
on consumption tariffs or markets for water quotas may not be feasible due to a weak public 
regulatory infrastructure. Taking a weak public regulatory infrastructure as the premise, a number 
of researchers (Ostrom et al (2002), Lam (1999), Dittz et al (2003) and Dolsak and Ostrom (2003)) 
suggest that systems of self governance may be a way to address the increasing need for regulating 
water use. The idea behind this is to use the self-interest in regulating water use to facilitate water 
allocation agreements among users. Potentially, such agreements could be enforced through social 
control without the need for public regulation and enforcement. Clearly, the efficiency of self-
governance critically depends on the existing social infrastructure and on the type of allocations that 
self-governing actors can agree on.  
In this paper, we take a weak public regulatory infrastructure as our premise and 
suggest an alternative approach to public water regulation that is less administratively demanding 
than existing mechanisms such as fees and tradable permits. Both require the measurement and 
control of each individual’s water use, something that may be difficult and/or very costly in many 
developing countries. What we suggest is that all water users pay a fee based on the same aggregate 
measure of water use. Therefore, the mechanism does not require the monitoring and control of 
each individual’s water use. This makes its implementation more feasible and potentially attractive 
for regulating water use in developing countries. In the following, we show that the proposed FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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mechanism has the potential of allocating water efficiently. This depends on the perception that 
water users have of their interaction with other water users. The main objective of the paper is to 
make the workings of the suggested mechanism transparent and to clarify the assumptions needed 
for it to induce an efficient allocation of water use. Several examples of how the mechanism can be 
relevant in practice exist. One example could be a common water resource used by several villages. 
Within each village, social control mechanisms may be actively regulating the use of water, 
whereas such mechanisms may be lacking between villages
1. One could imagine the 
implementation of incentives at the village level with our mechanism. Another possible application 
could be the regulation of large farms using a common water resource. Without the mechanism, 
each farm or village may extract water without regard for the effects this has on other villages or 
farms. However, with the mechanism (approximate) social optimal incentives could be generated. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature, while in 
section 3 a model of ground water extraction is formulated and the social optimum is found. Section 
4 describes individual behaviour, while section 5 introduces the proposed regulating tax 
mechanism. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
  2. Existing models of groundwater regulation in developing countries 
     
The core of the allocation problem is that water in many developing countries is a 
common pool resource, which is potentially subject to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin (1968) 
and (1998)). Water is typically available from commonly accessible streams, lakes or ground water 
with a limited supply. When there is unregulated access to the resource, each user´s water demand 
will only be constrained by the user’s private costs. If water is scarce, unregulated competition 
among users will generally result in an inefficient increase in these private costs because lower 
ground water levels necessitate deeper and more expensive private wells, or because nearby springs 
run dry so that water must be collected from more distant springs
2.  A potentially more critical 
consequence of open access may result if over exploitation of the resource damages its regenerative 
ability (e.g. lowering of the ground water table increases the risk of contamination). Thus, when 
                                                 
1 For example, Lam (1999) studies common resource water supply in Nepal with this two level structure and finds that 
there is little social control across village groups. 
2 In both cases, water demand is constrained as private users are forced to expend more resources on water access. 
However, an agreement among users to use less water would be more efficient achieving the same reduction, but saving 
water users the increased access costs.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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common pool water resources become scarce, unregulated extraction results in excessive use and a 
stock externality problem arises (see Neher, 1990). 
  Conflicts  between  users  in the face of water scarcity are not new to developing 
countries and such conflicts have traditionally been settled by local authorities in accordance with 
one of two dominating approaches (Ambec and Spurmont (2002)). The Riperian allocation 
approach allots land owners the right to extract water resources accessible on his land and, thereby, 
also the right to inflict negative external costs on other users of the same water source. The prior 
allocation approach gives the first user the right to uninhibited continued use, so that a land owner, 
who is the second user, only has the right to use water accessible from his land to the extent that this 
does not inhibit the first user (say a neighbouring land owner who was the first to start using the 
common ground water or stream). Prior allocation, in principle, prohibits new users from inflicting 
negative externalities on the first user of the resource. This approach, however, is inefficient, but 
more importantly, the approach is used to resolve conflicts between individuals and not as the basis 
of a general regulatory system. This means that in practice, only large and easily identifiable 
externalities originating from new users will be curtailed. Diffuse externalities, which affect many 
users, as well as effects of which the cause is not easily identified by victims, remain unregulated. 
Thus, even though water scarcity does result in the regulation of water extraction in many 
developing countries, none of the traditional conflict resolution approaches have been able to ensure 
efficient allocation or effective resource conservation (see Zilberman and Lipper (2000)), Ambec 
and Spurmont (2002) and Burness and Quirk (1979)).  
  Another line of research has suggested that ‘self-governance’ within the community 
may be an alternative to traditional conflict resolutions and (presumably inefficient) public 
regulation (Ostrom et al (2002), Lam (1999), Dittz et al (2003) and Dolsak and Ostrom (2003)). 
The idea is to develop and implement more efficient regulation of water users at the local level, 
building on traditional social structures that support collective decision-making. The attraction is 
that collective decision-making is better suited to recognise and to take the common pool externality 
problem into account than conflict resolution between individual water users. In addition, empirical 
studies show that self-governance is possible. For example, in Nepal where rural populations have a 
long tradition for collective action, Lam (1999) reports that self-governance has worked better than 
(notoriously ineffective) government intervention. However, many authors (e.g.  Lam (1999) and 
Ostrom (2002)) also point out that a number of tough conditions must be fulfilled for self-
governance to be a feasible alternative. Also, as scarcity increases, so may the forces that destabilise FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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the coalition. Furthermore, even though the resulting regulations may be an improvement on 
traditional conflict resolution, they may still be far from optimal. In fact, Lam (1999) shows that 
there is a considerable welfare loss associated with self-governance in Nepal. One reason for this is 
that the necessary negotiations are very time consuming (see Berkes (2006)) so that they often stop 
short of the optimal result. Another reason is that regulations are typically applied to easily 
observable actions that are often only imperfectly correlated with water extraction (Ostrom et al 
(2002)). Thus, self-governance has the potential to outperform traditional conflict resolution. 
However, self-governance is only feasible under favourable conditions and yet probably far from 
optimal.  
The classical policy recommendation from economists for water resource regulation 
problems is public intervention so that resource access is regulated by a public authority e.g. 
through taxes (Neher (1990)), or tradable quotas (Zilberman and Lipper (2000) and Becker et al 
(2001)). In theory, this type of regulation is able to conserve the resource effectively and to ensure 
efficient allocation. However, these types of public regulations require an efficient enforcement 
system that can produce dependable measures of each individual user’s water extraction. In 
developing countries, evasion possibilities and an ineffective public administration often make it 
unrealistic, or too costly to base regulation on this kind of detailed information about individual 
water user´s extraction. For this reason, many authors have argued that public intervention of this 
type is not a feasible alternative in the context of developing countries (see Saliba and Bush (1987) 
and Colby (1990)).  
    This is our point of departure from the existing literature. It seems that self-governance is not 
universally applicable and often far from efficient, while public regulation through fees or tradable 
quotas is potentially efficient, but infeasible in many developing countries because of unrealistic 
information requirements. Here we present the theoretical foundation for a new public regulatory 
instrument that generates the same efficiency inducing incentives that fees and tradable quotas 
would ideally generate, but without the information and monitoring requirements that are necessary 
for the functioning of these instruments. Drawing on the ambient pollution tax literature (see 
Segerson (1988) for an original contribution) and the literature on stock taxes for fisheries 
regulation (see Hansen et al (2006) for a recent contribution), we propose a tax based on a measure 
of aggregate extraction, rather than individual extraction measures. The model we develop applies 
to a common pool ground water resource, but the basic idea of basing regulating taxes on aggregate 
extraction measures carries over to other common water resource settings.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
  6
 
  3. A model of ground water extraction 
 
In this section, we develop a model of a common pool groundwater resource with n users that we 
suggest is applicable in a developing country setting. Each user derives benefits from groundwater 
extraction and incurs costs of extraction. The common pool externality arises because extraction 
costs depend on the available stock of water. Thus, intensive extraction may lower the stock of 
water and, thereby, increase extraction costs.
3 The model is developed for continuous time, 
assuming an infinite time horizon, no uncertainty and an exogenously determined natural recharge 
of ground water stocks
4.        
Let xt be the stock of groundwater at time t ,  hit user i’s rate of water extraction  at 







=∑  the aggregate rate of all groundwater extraction at time t.  Furthermore, let Ft   
be the natural growth or recharge rate of the resource which is stock independent. The rate of 
change of the stock of groundwater at time  t ,denoted  t x & , is thus: 
 
  tt t x FH =− &        ( 1 )  
 
We assume a standard specification of the water extraction cost functions (see Hellegers et al 
(1999)). Letting cit denote user i’s extraction costs at time t, we thus have: 
 
 (,) it i it t cc h x =      ( 2 )  
 

















Following Neher (1990), we assume positive, but decreasing marginal individual benefits of water 
                                                 
3 We may think of a lower groundwater level forcing users to use deeper and/or more distant wells. 
4Note that the analysis easily carries over to discrete time and a finite time horizon. Recharge through rainfall is 
typically stochastic and endogenous to some extent (e.g. lower groundwater stocks may reduce natural leakage to 
streams) and the incorporation of endogenous regeneration is straight forward. However, allowing for stochastic and 
endogenous recharge would not qualitatively change the results in the following, but it would complicate derivations 
and presentation substantially.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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extraction () ii t bh %  where  ´( ) 0, ´´( ) 0 ii t i i t bh b h >< %% . Furthermore, we define the net benefit function for 
user i by (see Hellegers et al (1999)): 
 




















Hence, to determine the socially optimal individual water extraction paths over time, we maximise 



















⎣⎦ ∑ ∫     ( 4 )  
 
 s.t.   
 
  0 , g i v e n tt t xFH xa =− = &       ( 5 )  
 
whereby ρ is the discount factor. In (4)  1 ... tn t hh  are the control variables, while xτ  is the state 
variable. x0 = a is an initial condition. There is no terminal condition because we have an indefinite 
time horizon. Instead, there are two transversality conditions (see (11) and (12) below). 
In the next subsection, the model is solved and the solution is interpreted.  
 
Model solution 








ii tt t t t
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     ( 6 )
 
 
whereby  t λ is the shadow price of the resource restriction i.e. the marginal social value of ground 
water stocks.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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The optimality conditions for this problem are: 
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1 ( ,..., , , ) tn t t t hh x λ  be the solution to the social planners problem at t=0 giving us the socially 
optimal time path of all water users’ extraction from t=0 and so on. This is the solution that a 
regulator with perfect information about the net benefit functions would like to implement.  
 
Interpretation 
The shadow price,  t λ , aggregates all the current and discounted future social net benefits of a 







, the maximum conditions (7) 
state that, in optimum, the discounted marginal net private benefit of extraction derived by each 









) must equal the shadow price of the water stock.  Equation (8), the so called adjoint 
equation, states that this shadow price must fall over time, as cost reducing benefits from water 
stocks are reaped by water users, since the shadow price captures the aggregate of discounted 
remaining future benefits. Finally, the state equation (9) defines water stock changes over time as a 
function of recharge and extraction. 
 Letting 





d τ λλ λ τ
∞
∞ =− ∫
&       ( 1 0 )  
 In addition, we have two transversality conditions (see Neher, 1990): 
 
lim ( ) 0
t Lt
→∞ =        ( 1 1 )  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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  lim  0         for   1,..., ti t t hi n λ
→∞ ==      (12) 
 
After inserting (6) equation (11) implies that  [ ] lim 0 tt t t FH λ




[ ] lim 0 tt t FH
→∞ −= . In the latter case, since Ft > 0 we must have lim  0   t t H
→∞ > . Since (12) implies 
that lim  0   tt t H λ
→∞ = we must have lim  0   t t λ
→∞ = . Thus, the transversality conditions imply that:  
  
  lim 0    t t λ
→∞ =        ( 1 3 )  
 
Intuitively, at ‘the end of time,’ water stocks have no value since no benefits are reaped from them 
beyond this point. 

















= ⎢⎥ ∂ ⎣⎦ ∑ ∫       ( 1 4 )  
By (3) this equals the value that water stocks have in reducing current and discounted future 

















= ⎢⎥ ∂ ⎣⎦ ∑ ∫ ). If 
users are myopic, this is the external effect that users do not take into account and for which 
regulation must compensate. 











optimal allocation aggregate net benefit function as 
1
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 for all 
t t H H
jj t t ii t t
it jt






,  (stating that marginal net benefit should 
be the same for all users). This then means that 
(, ) (, ) (, )
 for all 
t H
jj t t tt tt
ti t j t







j. Thus, the effect on aggregate benefit of a marginal change in any water user’s extraction is equal 
to the water user’s own marginal benefit of extraction. Conditional on a current level of ground FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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water stock and aggregate extraction, this function issues aggregate net benefits of all users if 
aggregate extraction is allocated optimally across users. It is obvious that: 
**
1
(, ) ( , )
n
tt i i t t
i







(, ) ( , )
n
tt i i t t
i
B Hx b hx
=
=∑  and so also that 
** **
1
(, ) ( , )
n
tt i i t t
i tt
dB H x db h x
dx dx =
=∑  . Therefore, the marginal 
aggregate benefit of stock size is equal to the sum of individual benefits of stock size. Thus, we may 














− ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ∂
=⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫      (15) 
 








we may write the key optimality for the socially optimal solution (7) as: 










−− ⎛⎞ ∂ ⎡⎤ ∂
−= = ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫
    
(16) 
Next we turn to a description of user behaviour. 
 
 
  4. User behaviour 
 
In the previous section, we found the socially optimal set of extraction paths that a regulator with 
perfect information would like to implement. Here we consider the extraction paths that the water 
users consider optimal to implement. However, it is not realistic to assume that water users have 
perfect information when they solve their optimisation problems, so let us initially make our 
assumptions about this clear.  
Users are characterised by their net benefit functions  ( , ) ii tt bh x and it seems reasonable 
to assume that water users know this function. Users can ascertain benefits and costs and they are 
typically able to observe how changes in the ground water level (a proxy for stocks) affect their 
extractions costs. However, water users do not typically know other users’ net benefit functions, nor 
do they typically observe the other users’ level of water extraction. Thus, water users may not 
perfectly realise how their own or aggregate water extraction affects water stocks, i.e. they often FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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underestimate this effect, or they may not even perceive that there is such an effect
5, thus, acting 
completely myopically. Furthermore, water users must base their plans on their own estimates of 
future aggregate extraction and derive from this their own expectations about future water stocks. 
We assume that water users have point expectations about future aggregate water extraction and 
derive from this point estimates of ground water stocks. We let 
e
it x denote user i’s expectation of the 
ground water stock at time t and 
e
it H  the corresponding expectation of aggregate water extraction at 
time t
6. User i maximises the discounted value of all future benefits and incorporates the expected 
future stocks and resource restrictions. With this objective, the maximisation problem of user i at 






ii ti t h
t









  0 () ,  g i v e n
ee
it i t it xg F H xa =− = &      (18) 
whereby  i g is a constant characterising user i‘s perception of how extraction affects water stocks. If 
0 gi = , water user i acts myopically and does not recognise any stock changes or stock effects 
arising from his own and others’ extraction behaviour. On the other hand, if   1 gi = , water user i
does correctly recognise such effects.  Furthermore, we generally assume that the individual water 
user recognises that his extraction at date t influences aggregate extraction at date t.   
 
Solving the users’ problem 
Following the steps developed in the previous section, the Hamiltonian function corresponding to 




i i it it it i t it Lb h x e g F H
ρ λ
− ⎡⎤⎡ ⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦⎣ ⎦        (19) 
 
                                                 
5For parsimony we have assumed exogenous and deterministic recharge. However, in stochastic environments with 
endogenous recharge and many other users, it may be difficult to ascertain how one’s own extraction affects the ground 
water stock. 
6 To simplify derivations in the following, we assume point estimates. This assumption is not critical and all results 
carry over qualitatively if we assumed that users held non-degenerative distributions over future water stocks. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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The optimality conditions: 
0 
e




















== − ⎢⎥ ∂ ⎣⎦
&
      
 (21) 
  () =  
ee





=−&       ( 2 2 )  
 
Again  it λ is the shadow price of the resource restriction reflecting the marginal value of ground 
water stocks, but now only to user i. The solution to this problem gives us the privately optimal 
time path of water user i‘s extraction from t=0, conditional on water user i‘s expectations about the 
present and future aggregate extraction at time t=0 and derived from this, his expectations about 
present and future water stocks. Before continuing, it is important to note that the water users’ 
expectations are not necessarily consistent with each other. Thus, as time progresses, some water 
users may be surprised about the development in current water stocks that they observe and may, as 
a consequence, revise their expectations and extraction plans. However, at any given point in time 
(here t=0), all water users have (possibly inconsistent) point expectations about all future aggregate 
extraction levels and so are able to solve (17) and (18) as indicated and undertake current extraction 
in accordance with this plan. 
Condition  (20) states that in optimum, the discounted marginal net private benefit of 








) must equal the ‘private’ shadow price of water 











). Below we will consider more carefully what expectations water users might 
have about this. Equation (21) states that the ‘private’ shadow price must fall over time, but since 
the shadow price only captures future benefits reaped by water user i , it only falls with the benefits 








). Finally, the state equation (22) defines 
how water user i expects the water stock to change over time, as a function of recharge and the 
expectations of aggregate extraction.     FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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  Again we let 
** lim ii t t λλ ∞ →∞ =
 
, using the transversality conditions, (11) and (12), and 












− ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ∂
=−⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫       ( 2 3 )  
Thus, the ‘private’ shadow price of water stock is the value that water stocks have in reducing 
current and discounted future extraction costs incurred by user i (i.e. the cost reductions reaped by 
other water users are disregarded).  
Using (23) we may write the key first order conditions for the privately optimal 
solution (20) as: 
0  for   1,...,
e










−− ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ∂∂ ∂
−= = ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫















are not obvious. First, considering  i g  , it is possible that the users do not perceive an important 
connection between water extraction and water stock costs (i.e. that  0 gi =  ). This is the myopic 
user’s assumption, which is customary in the literature (see e.g. Neher, 1990, Hellegers et al 2004), 
and for which there is some empirical support regarding Nepal (Lam, 1999). In this case, the 
individual simply assumes the marginal extraction cost is equal to marginal benefit at each instant 
of time and no water rent is recognised. Presumably, this ( 0 i g = ) is one outer bound regarding 
perceptions with the other outer bound being the correct perception of the effect on ground water 
stocks ( 1 i g = )
7.  
Now consider how user i expects a change in his own extraction to affect aggregate 









 , i.e. a change in individual extraction will 
change aggregate extraction by the same amount. This corresponds to the standard assumption of 
Nash conjectures (i.e. that users do not expect other users to react to one’s own change in 
                                                 
7 Users could, in theory, also perceive exaggerated effects of extraction on stocks. However, the consensus in the 
literature seems to be that there is a downward bias in misperceptions i.e. that users need to see evidence of effects 
before taking them into account.     FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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extraction) and this seems well founded here, since users do not typically observe other users’ 
extraction. However, consider a water user who, on the one hand, perceives that his extraction 
increase affects the water stock ( 1 i g = ) and also realises that this affects his own extraction costs. 
Such a water user might also realise that other users’ extraction costs will be affected and he may 











8   In the following, we will look at regulation under three assumptions about 
user perceptions: 































































Clearly Myopic and Correct Nash perceptions are boundary cases. Non-Nash perceptions result in a 
perceived effect within this bound. However, as we will see in the following, Non-Nash perceptions 
differ crucially in another dimension, which turns out to be important when considering the type of 
regulatory instruments we propose in the following.  
 
  5. Regulating extraction 
 
We now consider how regulation might be imposed in order to secure optimality. The regulator 
wants to implement the social optimum characterised by optimality conditions (16), but is faced 










− ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ∂
⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫
 
capturing the stock effect on net benefits of all users. In (24), the ‘private’ 










− ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ∂
⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫ . Thus, the individual user at 
                                                 








 and it also seems reasonable to assume this of expectations. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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) only takes account of the stock effect on his own net benefits and does not 
take account of the net benefit effect he has on other users. In general therefore, the private and 
social shadow prices differ and this is the externality that makes regulation necessary.  
  However, even if we assume that the regulator can estimate the optimal aggregate net 
benefit function  (.,.) B  , implementing an optimal set of extraction taxes seems quite demanding. 
First, each user’s consumption must be measured accurately. Second, the regulator would have to 
know each user’s private net benefit functions and their expectations about future stock levels in 
order to calculate the correct fee rate for each user. Both are clearly unrealistic assumptions in a 
third world setting. 
 
The aggregate extraction tax 
Here we will assume that the regulator can only measure the ground water stock and recharge and 
from this derive the aggregate extraction. It is further assumed that the regulator is able to identify 
the set of users who extract groundwater. However, we assume that the regulator is not able to 
accurately measure individual users’ extraction levels, or the net benefit functions of individual 
users. Furthermore, we assume that the regulator has no information about individual users’ stock 
expectations.  
As mentioned above, we will assume that the regulator can estimate the aggregate net 
benefit function,  (.,.) B . Although this seems an unrealistic assumption, it turns out not to be so if 
the tax on aggregate extraction suggested below is actually implemented. If this is the case, the 
aggregate net benefit function can be estimated by trial and error experiments (see subsection below 















= ∫       ( 2 6 )  
 
 s.t.   
 
  0 , =  given  tt t xFH x a =− &       ( 2 7 )  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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Using the solution procedure and transversality constraints as above, the optimality condition can be 
calculated to be: 
 










−− ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ∂∂
−= ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫      (28) 
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⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫  found in 













−− ⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ∂
=⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ∫       ( 2 9 )  
 
The fee is based on aggregate extraction  t H  (which he can measure) that must be paid by each user 
irrespective of his own extraction level. Thus, rather than measuring each individual user’s 
extraction and calculating a tax payment based on this, all users pay the same tax calculated from 







=∑  (i.e. all users pay the same fee on aggregate 
extraction). The regulator announces taxes (fees) and expected resulting groundwater stocks for all 
future periods found from (28), but also makes clear that the taxes (fees) will not be changed if 
stocks should deviate.  
Hence, as we assume that the individual water user recognises that his water 
extraction influences aggregate extraction and thus his tax payment, the maximisation problem of 







ii ti t i ti t h
t





⎡⎤ − ⎣⎦ ∫      (30) 
 
 s.t. 
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  0 () ,  g i v e n
ee
it i t it xg F H xa =− = &      (31) 
 
Using the standard solution procedure, transversality condition and assuming interior solution, the 
key optimality condition for the privately optimal solution corresponding to (20) becomes: 
 
0  for   1,...,
ee
t it it i it
it i
it it it t
bH b H
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Inserting the fee defined in (28) and rearranging terms, the optimality condition becomes: 
  
() 0  for   1,...,
ee
t it it i it
i
it it it tt
bH b H B
ee d e d g i n
hx h x h
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−+ = = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ∫∫
     
(33) 
 
Now comparing with the corresponding optimality condition for social optimum in (10), we see that 









), the suggested aggregate extraction 
tax implements social optimum (i.e. (33) reduces to (16)). If water users have correct Nash 









), the tax ‘over corrects’ since benefits reaped by user i are counted 
twice. In this case, social optimum is not implemented. However, if n is large the error is small. A 
large n implies that individual benefit is small compared to aggregate benefit. Thus, as long as n is 
large and users have Nash conjectures the tax will, irrespective of user perceptions about the effect 
of extraction on stocks, achieve a set of extraction paths that are ‘close to’ optimal (second-best 
optimal).       









). On the 
one hand, the private shadow price of extraction is reduced, which makes users react more 
myopically at the outset. Thus, the ‘small’ approximation error that appeared with correct Nash 









 the incentive effect of the aggregate extraction 
tax is also scaled down and will be smaller. Thus, since users take into account the fact that the FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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reactions of other users reduce the stock effect of their initial extraction change; the efficiency 
effect of the tax is also reduced. This is potentially devastating for the regulatory effect of the tax. In 
the extreme case in which users believe that other users’ reactions completely remove the initial 
effect, the tax will have little or no incentive effect. 
 
Estimating the aggregate benefit function  
Now consider the key assumption that the regulator can estimate the optimal allocation aggregate 
net benefit functions, (.,.) B . In case of myopic perceptions, the regulator can use a trial and error 
period with the aggregate consumption tax to generate data to estimate the aggregate net benefit 
function. Since the tax under myopic Nash perceptions ensures the optimal allocation of aggregate 
extraction, aggregating (24) over users gives 
(, )










 in the trial and 
error period. All the aggregate variables are observed by the regulator making estimation of  (.,.) B
possible. This is also approximately the case when users do perceive an effect of extraction on 
stocks, as long as the number of users is large and they have Nash conjectures.  
For Non-Nash perceptions, this breaks down since the incentive effect of the tax is 
scaled down. Without knowledge of the scaling effect of Non-Nash perceptions, the regulator does 
not know the perceived value of the incentives generating variation in aggregate extraction and 
stock in the trial period.  
 
 
  6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we have suggested a fee for regulating common resource water use based on 
aggregate extraction. All users pay the same tax calculated from an aggregate extraction measure. 
This makes implementation of the tax feasible, also for regulators who are unable to monitor 
individual water users’ extraction – a situation that is common in developing countries. Further, use 
of the fee would make it possible for the regulator to estimate the aggregate benefit function and so 
make it possible for him to set the fee level optimally.  
The fee results in an efficient allocation of water use if water users believe that their 
own extraction does not affect their own extraction costs (i.e. myopic perceptions). When water 
users recognise this, the fee still results in an approximately efficient allocation The critical 
assumption about water users’ perception needed for the mechanism to ensure an approximate FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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efficient allocation of water use is that they do not believe that their own water extraction affects the 
water extraction of other users (i.e. that they have Nash conjectures about how other water users 
react). If water users believe that other users react by mitigating the initial change in water 
extraction, then the incentive effect of aggregate tax is scaled down, which is potentially devastating 
for the regulatory effect of the tax. However, water is a necessity with a low elasticity of demand 
once demand has been reduced substantially. Further, the goal of reducing extraction is to reduce 
the importance of cost increasing stock effects. Thus, both these effects suggest that once regulation 
has been initiated, extraction will not be highly responsive to changes in ground water stock and so 
Nash perceptions or even myopic perceptions are easier to rationalise. 
Another important consideration is fairness. The fact that an agent’s tax payment is 
influenced by the extraction of other agents could be perceived as unfair . This ‘problem’ grows as 
the number of regulated agents grows and the mechanism is perhaps politically unfeasible unless 
the number of regulated agents is small. The reason why the problem grows with the number of 
agents is that the aggregate benefit grows. The fairness problem increases with the number of 
agents, but at the same time, efficiency increases with the number of agents if they have Nash 
perceptions. Thus, there is a trade-off between fairness and efficiency. Hence, a lack of complete 
fairness must be weighed against the additional costs under other forms of regulation and the costs 
under open-access. Clearly, costs under other forms of regulation, based on the measurement of 
individual extraction, is higher than the costs associated with the mechanism proposed in this paper. 
Further, it is also clear that if other regulatory incentives are in place when the mechanism is 
imposed (for example social control incentives), then the resulting allocation will not be efficient. 
Thus, when comparing the proposed mechanism to that of self governance, it should not perhaps be 
seen as an alternative, but rather as a fall back possibility in situations in which self governance is 
ineffective. When self-governance is effective it generates a Pareto improvement that is perceived 
as fair by water users without any reliance on regulatory infrastructure. The proposed mechanism 
does require a regulatory infrastructure that can identify water users, undertake the measurement of 
aggregate extraction and collect taxes. Thus, the type of situation for which one might think the 
suggested mechanism could be relevant is one in which social control mechanisms are not active 
among a relatively small group of regulated water users. As noted, social control mechanisms may 
be strong within a village. However, since social control mechanisms are typically weak across 
village boundaries when a common water resource is used by several villages, the proposed 
mechanism may be applicable at the village level. One could imagine the village council being FOI Working Paper 2011 / 3 
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made subject to the tax on a measure aggregating the water use of all villages which draw water 
from the same reservoir. The tax would not necessarily have to be paid in currency – but could be in 
the form of supply in kind (labour), or in the form of reduced government subsidies, supplies or 
access to government resources (land). Another possible application could be the regulation of a 
group of large farms using a common water resource among which social control mechanisms are 
not strong. A possible next step could be to investigate this type of mechanism experimentally in a 
third world setting resembling those discussed here.  
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